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Non-technical Summary
Distinct settings of labor market institutions like the employment protection or the unemployment benefit system have attracted considerable attention as a potential explanation for differences in the unemployment rates of industrialized countries over the last two decades. A plethora of theoretical and empirical studies have dealt with the identification and quantification of direct labor market effects of institutional reforms. However, while theory predicts that the interplay between individual labor market institutions is as well important to determine the impact of institutional reforms, empirical studies have widely neglected such interdependencies so far.
The main problem in empirical studies is that macroeconomic labor market models quickly become very large if interactions are taken into account. Hence, the estimation of a model considering a set of institutional interactions requires either exact and comprehensive theoretical predictions on which interactions to include or a large number of observations to receive reliable results. Unfortunately, theoretical studies mainly focus on broad concepts of institutions like the bargaining power or the firing costs, and empirical data-based models cannot be directly derived from theory. The low number of available observations requires the subjective selection of some interactions, what is also not an appropriate solution because neglecting potentially relevant information can severely bias the outcomes.
In this study, I use a bayesian model averaging framework to estimate reliable parameters for all available bivariate interaction terms. Using data on 14 institutional indicators of 5 institutional categories (product market regulation, employment protection, unemployment benefit system, labor tax system, bargaining system), 91 bivariate interactions are analyzed concerning the question whether these interactions can significantly contribute to the explanation of unemployment.
On the basis of the model averaging approach, I identify 22 robust and significant bivariate interaction terms. The empirical evidence emphasizes the importance of institutional interactions for the determination of unemployment. More concretely, taking interactions into account significantly improves the explanatory power of the empirical model. The calculation of country-specific marginal effects of institutions sheds light on the question why institutional reforms might result in different outcomes in different countries in terms of unemployment. Furthermore, the results can give advice how reform-packages implemented to tackle labor market rigidities should be designed in order to decrease unemployment.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen wie der Kündigungsschutz oder das System der Arbeitslosenunterstützung sind in den vergangenen zwei Jahrzehnten häufig als Erklärungsfaktor für erhebliche 
Introduction
The direct influence of labor market regulations on unemployment has been predicted in several theoretical models and confirmed in a number of empirical contributions. However, the interplay between individual labor market institutions has been widely neglected in the empirical literature, mainly due to the infeasibility to correctly specify the econometric model. The main problem is that if interactions are taken into account, the empirical model quickly becomes very large. In this paper, a model averaging approach is applied to overcome the problem of model mis-specification. The method helps to reasonably test a large number of interactions for significance, to show that taking interactions into account improves the explanatory power of the empirical model, and to deliver evidence on the functioning and performance of different institutional systems.
Several attempts have been made to capture direct and indirect effects of institutions on the labor market. Concerning direct effects, Saint-Paul (2004) and Nickell and Layard (1999) provide an overview on theoretical mechanisms while Nickell et al. (2005) and Baccaro and Rei (2007) are examples for empirical studies. Similarly, the interdependence of product and labor market regulation and its impact on the labor market has been found to be of significance by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) and Griffith et al. (2007) , for instance. The dependence of macroeconomic shocks from labor market institutions and their joint effect on unemployment has also been analyzed by Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nickell et al. (2005) , though there seems to be no interdependence. Furthermore, the interplay between labor and financial market institutions was a central aspect of the studies by Wasmer and Weil (2004) or Gatti et al. (2010) .
Interactions between individual labor market institutions have also been examined in a few studies. van Ours (2001, 2004 ) use a right-to-manage model to construct testable hypotheses for the empirical analysis. More specifically, they test interactions between the tax rate and the replacement rate, and the bargaining centralization with both the union density and the employment protection. They find that, depending on the particular specifica-tion, all considered interactions contribute significantly to the explanation of unemployment.
However, although the theoretical model predicted further interactions, the authors refrained from estimating them due to data limitations. The IMF (2003) estimated 4 variants of such unemployment equations, all of them including up to 7 interactions between several institutions. Nevertheless, the model specifications have been carried out on an ad-hoc basis, so that the results are probably sensitive to robustness checks. Bassanini and Duval (2006) as well as Baccaro and Rei (2007) also estimated several institutional interactions. As mentioned by the authors, the results seem to be rather sensitive to the inclusion of further interactions and to the specific estimation strategy. Furthermore, both studies point out that the estimation of such a complex interaction network, i.e. a large set of institutional interactions, requires either exact and comprehensive theoretical predictions regarding institutional interactions or much more observations to receive reliable results. The main problem with interaction terms is that even if only a small number of institutional indicators is considered, the number of possible interactions is substantially larger. It can be learned from this brief literature overview that the empirical estimation of several institutional interactions requires the inclusion of a large number of interaction terms. Since empirical macroeconomic models are restricted in terms of number of observations, either a limited number of theoretically established interaction terms or an adequate estimation strategy to deal with a large number of interactions is required. Although the theoretical literature gives some guidance on the interplay of some specific labor market institutions like, for instance, Blanchard and Tirole (2008) or Boeri et al. (2003) on unemployment benefits and employment protection, or Daveri and Tabellini (2000) on labor taxes and bargaining power, a comprehensive theoretical model describing the interplay of more than just two in-stitutions and providing clear predictions on significant interactions is missing. An exception is Coe and Snower (1997) . Indeed, 5 different labor market policy fields are considered in their model. But the assumptions concerning the effects of deregulating reforms are simplified in a sense that deregulation is generally beneficial. This does not reflect the advances of the literature which draws a more complex picture of the functioning of labor market institutions.
In this study, I use a model averaging framework to estimate reliable parameters for all bivariate interaction terms which are robust to alterations of the model specification. Using data on 14 institutional indicators of 5 institutional categories (product market regulation, employment protection, unemployment benefit system, labor tax system, bargaining system), 91 bivariate interactions are analyzed concerning the question whether these interactions can con- Furthermore, the results give advice how reform-packages implemented to tackle labor market rigidities should be designed to decrease unemployment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly explains the empirical strategy and introduces the BACE approach. Section 3 gives an overview on the data and data construction methods. In section 4, robust and significant interactions are identified on the basis of the model averaging approach. In section 5, marginal effects for institutional changes are calculated and country-specific labor market effects of institutional reforms are presented for different countries.
Furthermore, the economic significance of the institutional interactions is discussed. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Empirical Strategy
The basic empirical model is
where U E i,t represents the actual unemployment rate, α i and λ t are time-and countryspecific effects, Inst i,t are 14 individual institutional indicators, and Controls i,t are 4 macroeconomic shocks as well as an indicator for the constraints to credit access. This factor appeared to be of importance in, for instance, Dromel et al. (2010) . The factors of interest are contained in the vector Interactions i,t . The model averaging approach applied in this paper enables to assess whether the variation of the set of explanatory variables changes the results of the variables under inspection. Here, the variables under inspection are 91 bivariate interactions.
The variation comes therefore from building different combinations of interaction terms, and to look whether the significance of the variables of interest changes when the set of interactions (as explanatory variables) is altered. Note that the control variables and the 14 individual institutions appear in all regressions. The inclusion of the 14 institutional variables is necessary since these factors are the constitutive terms of the interactions. According to Brambor et al. (2006) , the inclusion of all constitutive terms is obligatory when estimating interaction models. The model averaging approach is explained in greater detail in the following section.
Bayesian Model Averaging
Model mis-specification can lead to severely biased results, mainly due to omitted variable bias, especially if theory does not provide a clear guide on which variables and interactions to include. For instance, according to an example provided by Bassanini and Duval (2006) , the impact of the labor taxation might be independent of minimum wages. If, however, minimum wages are correlated with the bargaining power, and the labor taxes at the same time interact with the bargaining power, then the exclusion of the interaction between labor taxes and the bargaining power causes the interaction between labor taxes and minimum wages to be significant. However, there are a lot of potentially interacting factors and including all of them jointly in one model is infeasible due to limitations in terms of degrees of freedom. One possible solution to this problem is to avoid specifying a particular model. Rather, this model uncertainty is particularly taken into account by exploiting information of a large number of models. A particular model consists of the fixed regressors plus a random number of varying regressors like, for instance, institutional interactions. First, P (M j |y) is the weight of a model j in relation to the sum of the weights of all possible models. It is calculated as
The term SSE considers the sum of squared errors of a regression to account for the quality of a model, and is corrected for degrees of freedom according to the Schwartz model selection criterion. N is the number of cross-sections, i.e. countries, T is the number of time periods, K is the total number of explanatory factors, and k i and k j are the number of explanatory variables in the particular models i and j. Note that the explanatory factors comprise only those which are varied conditional on the particular model, and not the variables which are held fix in all estimations. Hence, given the basic empirical model of equation (1), only the interaction terms are variable while the individual institutional indicators as well as the shock terms are held fix. The sum of the weights P (M j |y) over all models a variable appears in gives the posterior inclusion probability of this variable.
Furthermore, P (M j ) is the prior model probability related to model j. This probability is calculated as
In other words, P (M j ) is a weighting factor to correct for the model size, i.e. for the number of explanatory variables with k being the prior model size. This term expresses the researcher's belief about the true model size, i.e. the true number of interaction terms in the model, before seeing the data. The prior model size is crucial for the determination of the prior inclusion probability. This probability is calculated as k K , i.e. the prior model size divided by the total number of explanatory factors which are varied. Models with a size close to the prior model size is given a higher weight. In doing so, I correct for the fact, that models with a large number of explanatory variables per se achieve a better fit than models with only few explanatory factors.
3 Data
Annual data on 14 institutional indicators has been gathered for 5 institutional categories; the labor tax system, the employment protection legislation, the wage bargaining system, the product market regulation, and the unemployment benefit system. Each category comprises some indicators which capture a part of the particular institutional class. The bayesian model averaging approach applied in this paper requires to use a completely balanced data-set. Hence, the time period is restricted to 1982 to 2005, and the country sample includes 17 OECD countries.
2 Data availability constraints are also the reason for not considering alternative institutional categories like, for instance, migration policy, family policy, or the retirement system.
Additionally, control variables are taken into account to capture short-run fluctuations of the unemployment rate which can not be traced back to institutional rigidities. I generally follow Nickell et al. (2005) in constructing 4 shock variables, a labor demand shock, an import price shock, a total factor productivity shock, and the real interest rate. All variables which are used in the estimations are described in greater detail in the following.
Institutions
The labor tax system is characterized by the payroll tax (TX1), the income tax (TX2), and the consumption tax (TX3). They have been constructed according to the definition given in Nickell and Nunziata (2001) . The payroll tax is T X1 = where it is the direct tax spending and hcr the household's current receipts. The consumption tax is T X3 = tls f ce whit tls being the taxes less subsidies on products and imports, while f ce is the households' final consumption expenditure.
The indicators have been recalculated and some changes to the original series in Nickell and Nunziata (2001) exist, probably due to data revisions.
The employment protection legislation is covered by protection for regular (EPL1), and for temporary employment (EPL2). According to the OECD, the former index consists of information on procedural inconveniences for the employer when executing a dismissal, on notice periods and severance payments, and on further impediments which can complicate the execution of a dismissal. The latter index captures information on the relevance of fixedterm contracts compared to permanent contracts by including several dimensions of fixed-term contracts, and on the regulation of temporary work agencies. Both indices have a range from 0 to 6 where the value increases with the strictness of employment protection. Both series have been delivered by the OECD.
States. Further OECD countries like Ireland or South Korea had to be excluded due to some missing data. Finally, the approach to construct indicators for the unemployment benefit system has been taken from Nickell (2006) . The unemployment benefits show the transfer payments during a period of unemployment, averaged over different family and income situations as a fraction of the last income. Detailed information on these situations can be found in OECD (1994), chapter 8. The first year benefits (UB1) capture the transfer payments during the first year of unemployment. Similarly, the second and third year benefits (UB2) show the transfer payments averaged over the second and third year of unemployment, and the fourth and fifth year benefits (UB3) refer to the fourth and fifth year of unemployment. Note that the tax benefit models provided by the OECD have to be used for updating. Unfortunately, the tax benefit models provide data on unemployment benefits which are incorrect for some countries. The particular time series have to be checked and adjusted according to the countryspecific definitions available at the OECD, benefits and wages homepage. Information on the coverage of the unemployment benefit system (UBC) is delivered by the Fondazione Rodolfo de Benedetti. The indicator is calculated as the fraction of job-seekers entitled to benefits over the total number of job-seekers. Observations are missing for Belgium (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , Italy (1982-1989 and 2003-2005) , Sweden (1982 Sweden ( -1994 , Switzerland (1982 Switzerland ( -1984 and the United Kingdom (1996) . In these cases the value for the first preceding or successive valid observation is taken for the missing observation. If both a proceeding and successive valid observation is available, the mean is taken.
Macroeconomic variables
The dependent variable is the harmonized unemployment rate taken from the OECD. Some data is missing for earlier periods for some countries. To ensure consistent time series, I calculate the growth rates of the unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labor force (which is not harmonized) and extend the harmonized unemployment rates by concatenating the change of the country-specific unemployment rate. Only Austria from 1982 to 1992, Germany from 1982 to 1990 and Switzerland from 1982 to 1991 are affected by this adjustment.
The labor demand shock is the change in the residuals of a labor demand model which is
T E is total employment, Y is the real GDP and LC are the real labor costs per employee.
The real labor costs are calculated as the total labor costs of the total economy divided by the number of dependently employed workers. The real import price is the import price deflator divided by the GDP deflator. The shock is then the log change in the real import price times the import share in GDP. The real interest rate is the long-term interest rate minus the current inflation rate. The factor productivity shock has been constructed according to Bassanini and Duval (2006) . First, the change in the log of TFP is calculated as
with Y equal to the GDP in the business sector, T E is total employment, K the gross capital stock, and α the share of labor income in total business sector income. A value for the annual TFP is constructed by cumulating the changes in the log TFP's over years. Finally, I take the deviations from the TFP trend to construct an index for TFP shocks by applying the HodrickPrescott filter with a λ of 100. A money supply shock as in Nickell et al. (2005) 
Identification of robust and significant institutional interactions
Model averaging enables the researcher to avoid a subjective decision on which variables to include in a model. Nevertheless, the number of explanatory variables is limited by the data availability. Only such interactions can be considered for which data is comprehensively available. Hence, 91 bivariate interaction terms are tested for significance within the bayesian model averaging approach. Generally, an interaction term with a posterior inclusion probability above 3 Braumoeller (2004) states that once a model with more than one interaction is specified, attention has to be paid to implicit interactions. For the interaction models considered in this paper it would be necessary to include a full set of n k=1 n k interactions where n is the number of institutional indicators. Besides the bivariate interactions, higher-order interactions should therefore also be considered. Unfortunately, this would require the inclusion and interpretation of 16383 interactions. Obviously, this is infeasible and the problem of implicit interactions cannot be taken into account. The opportunity to gain information on bivariate interactions comes at the price of a possible bias due to the negligence of implicit interactions.
4 This is calculated as prior model size number of institutional interactions .
the corresponding prior inclusion probability is considered as significant dependent on the prior model size. Note, that the alteration of the prior model size is done to check the robustness of the outcomes. Therefore, an interaction term is only called robust and significant if its posterior inclusion probability is above the corresponding prior inclusion probability for all considered prior model sizes. The results are displayed in table 1 where the variables are sorted according to their posterior inclusion probability for a prior model size of 30 in a descending order. Only interaction terms which are significant for at least one prior model size specification are reported in order to avoid illegible tables.
The findings attach a significant effect on the unemployment rate to 22 interaction terms independent of the prior model size. Further 13 interaction terms have posterior inclusion probabilities above the prior inclusion probabilities for some prior model sizes, but not for all.
Hence, these 13 interactions are not called significant.
The technical procedure of estimating posterior inclusion probabilities with a large number of explanatory factors can lead to slightly changing results for two runs with the same specification. While this is not relevant for most of the interactions, it can be of importance for variables with a posterior inclusion probability around the prior inclusion probability. Hence, the results have been generated twice for each prior model size to secure that the decision of significance is not driven by a slightly imprecise convergence process. While for few variables the results indeed change for some prior model sizes, the overall findings on significance and robustness remain unchanged. Hence, the 22 robust and significant interaction terms identified in this section build therefore the basis for the further analysis. The dependent variable is the unemployment rate. The 5 control variables as well as the 14 institutional indicators have been included in all regressions. Overall, models consisting of combinations of up to 91 interaction terms have been considered. Fixed country-and time-specific effects are swept by using the Within transformation (see Baltagi 2003) . Only variables with a posterior inclusion probability above the prior inclusion probability for at least one prior model size specification are displayed in the table. Prior incl. prob. is the prior inclusion probability.
Do interactions really help to explain unemployment?
The model averaging approach applied in this paper helps to evaluate whether bivariate inter- and for temporary employment (EP L1 * EP L2) which is only significant at the 10%-level. The dependent variable is the unemployment rate. The 5 control variables as well as the unemployment benefit coverage are included in both models, but not displayed. *** means significance at the 1%, ** at the 5%, and * at the 10%-level.
Are the findings in line with the literature?
The econometric analysis deliberately abstracted from using theoretical predictions for the construction of hypotheses. Nevertheless, a brief discussion and classification of the results is given in dependence on the existing literature. However, comparing the findings of this study with the previous literature is hindered by the distinct characterization of institutions. While theoretical studies refer to concepts like the bargaining power, firing taxes and costs, or the search intensity of the unemployed, empirical studies need to find appropriate observable measures for these concepts. For instance, the workers' bargaining power is usually described by the union density or union coverage, but could also be captured by minimum wage agreements. Furthermore, there exist several variables at distinct aggregation levels within the same institutional category. One could use the payroll, the income and the consumption tax, or the sum of all three factors (the tax wedge) to describe the labor tax system. While the more disaggregated variables can help to draw a more detailed picture of the impact of institutions, the interpretation is more difficult, especially when it comes to interactions. The analysis conducted in this paper uses disaggregated measures, when possible. When theory predicts a connection between, for example, the unemployment benefits and the employment protection, 6 interaction terms are affected. Hence, a comparison with the findings of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature might suffer from the fact, that it is sometimes infeasible to identify comparable interactions.
For example, Daveri and Tabellini (2000) theoretically predict and empirically confirm a positive interaction between the labor tax burden and the workers' bargaining power. The central idea is that additional costs of increasing labor taxes are distributed between employers and employees according to the workers' bargaining power. If the workers have a certain degree of power, they can shift the costs to the employer. Hence, the bargaining power should interact with factors that increase costs which are distributed between the employee and the employer.
Hence, the higher the bargaining power, the more detrimental a cost increase, what is equal to a positive sign of the interaction term. The IMF (2003) was not able to confirm the findings of Daveri and Tabellini (2000) . The signs of the coefficients of the interactions between the union density and both the employment protection as well as the tax wedge are negative.
Bassanini and Duval (2009) also find a negative, but insignificant effect of both interactions.
I prefer to use the union coverage (U C) as an indicator for the workers' bargaining power since this factor better describes the unions range and power in the wage bargaining. Institutional changes which can produce additional labor costs are labor taxes as well as firing costs. While the former is represented by the payroll (T X1), the income (T X2) and the consumption tax (T X3), the latter is captured by the employment protection for regular as well as for temporary employment (EP L1 and EP L2). However, only one such interaction (EP L1 * U C) appears as significant, but has the wrong negative sign.
A second type of interaction has been established by Hall and Soskice (2001) The third type of interaction deals with the interplay between labor demand and supply.
An institutional reform which raises labor demand only affects equilibrium unemployment if enough labor is supplied. In contrast, a reform fostering labor supply calls for sufficient labor demand to be effective. An example for this, mentioned by Belot and van Ours (2001) , is a decrease of unemployment benefits which has no effect if not sufficient jobs are provided, for instance due to high employment protection. Since it is not feasible to disentangle the particular institutional impacts on labor demand and supply, a simplification conducted and it is assumed that the unemployment benefits mainly affect labor supply, while the employment protection, labor taxes, the minimum wage, the bargaining power, and the product market 
Conditional effects of institutions
The results of the previous estimations show that each institutional indicator is important as an interaction partner for some other institution, except for the bargaining coverage (UBC).
The indicators which appear most frequently as interaction partners are the payroll tax (TX1), the minimum wage (MW), and the entry barriers (EB) with 5 appearances in interaction terms. Furthermore, the union coverage (UC) and the public ownership (POS) are included in 4 interaction terms. The least important interaction partners, given the appearances in interaction terms, are the bargaining coordination (BCO) and the first year unemployment benefits (UB1). Form the results presented in table 2, it is generally possible to deduce the impact of an institutional change on the unemployment rate conditional on other institutional
factors. This will be done in the following.
Calculating marginal effects
The calculation of marginal effects of institutional changes needs to consider both the direct as 
gives an estimation equation with two institutional factors X 1 and X 2 as well as an interaction between both factors X 1 X 2 . Then, the marginal effect of, for instance, X 1 is
β 1 gives the effect of X 1 for X 2 = 0, while β 2 shows the dependence of a change in X 1 on X 2 . Given the equations (6) and (7) 
Equation (8) If the minimum wage value was known, it would be feasible to calculate the threshold level for the payroll tax. Similarly, for a known value of the payroll tax, the threshold level for the minimum wage could be calculated. The first coefficient again only shows the effect of the income tax for both the payroll tax and the minimum wage being jointly zero.
In order to tackle this problem, the mean values for all conditioning variables are taken except of the one conditioning variable of interest. If one is interested, for instance, in the interaction between the income tax and the minimum wage, the mean value for the payroll tax over all countries and years is inserted in equation (9) Since the minimum wage index can only be a natural number from the set M W = {1, 2, ...., 8}, values of 1,2,3 and 4 assign a positive impact on unemployment to an income tax increase, while values of 5,6,7, and 8 mean a negative marginal effect of an income tax reform on unemployment, given that the payroll tax is at its mean. Table 4 contains the threshold levels for each combination of interaction partners. If there is more than just one interaction partner, the mean values are taken to calculate the threshold level for the indicator of interest. Table 4 With the descriptive statistics for Germany, the calculations can be carried out with the mean value over time as well as with the 2005 values, both for Germany. The results on the impact of institutional changes enable to draw a clear picture of which institutional reforms might be beneficial for the german labor market. Table 6 However, the impact of an increase in the income tax on the unemployment rate is completely different. While an increase in the income tax in France increases the unemployment rate, the effect goes in the opposite direction for the United States. According to table 4, the impact of an income tax change depends on the payroll tax (TX1) and on the minimum wage (M W ). Both countries have rather rigid minimum wage settings for which reason the payroll tax is the crucial factor. France with a value of 27 % has a much higher payroll tax level than the United States with about 6 %. Similarly, the impact of an increase in the bargaining coordination (BCO) has a distinct impact in Sweden and in Japan although the degree of coordination is the same. Again, the variation in the conditioning variable between both countries, the union coverage (U C) which is at 92 % in Sweden and at about 16 % in Japan, delivers the explanation for this effect. Another interesting point is the connection between the employment protection and the unemployment benefits. Table 4 shows that the impact of the first year benefits (UB1) only depends on the employment protection for regular employment (EPL1). The interplay between both variables, the unemployment benefits as well as the degree of employment protection, has been emphasized in the literature (see Blanchard and Tirole 2008) . A look at the tables 7 and 8 points out the distinct effect of an employment protection reform in countries with different levels of first year unemployment benefits. While an increase in the employment protection for regular employment in France and in Sweden (with benefit levels of roughly 60 and 75 %) are linked to a fall in the unemployment rate, the same kind of reform increases unemployment in the United States and Japan (with benefit levels of roughly 30 and 22 %).
Marginal effects of institutional reforms for selected countries

Economic significance and heterogeneity over countries
In order to check whether the results are economically significant, a closer look is taken at the fourth and fifth column of table 6 which contains the marginal effects for all 14 institutional indicators for Germany. The values for all conditioning variables are the observations for 2005.
For the interpretation of coefficients it has to be taken into account that the unemployment rate has been divided by 10 for all estimations due to computational reasons. A look at table 6 points out that most of the coefficients are not only statistically but also economically 
7
The heterogeneity in the institutional impact is present for most of the indicators. Exceptions are the consumption tax (TX3) and the second and third year benefits with a negative coefficient, and the public ownership (POS) with a positive coefficient for all five countries. Nevertheless, the calculation of marginal effects for some more countries also shows heterogeneity for these factors as well.
6 The OECD provides a measure for the minimum wage relative to the average of full-time workers. Unfortunately, the series are not comprehensively available for the period and countries included in this study.
7 Recently, Dube et al. (2010) found a positive employment effect through an minimum wage increase in restaurants and other low-wage sectors by exploiting a more comprehensive data-set. Whether this result holds true only for the United States and the specific sectors or whether it can also be applied to other countries and sectors is still unclear.
Conclusions
The identification of robust and significant bivariate interaction terms between individual institutions is carried out with the help of a bayesian model averaging approach. 91 institutional interactions consisting of bivariate combinations of 14 institutional indicators are tested for significance. Overall, 22 interaction terms robustly contribute to the explanation of the unemployment rate for 17 OECD countries from 1982 to 2005.
Except for the unemployment benefit coverage (UBC), all remaining 13 indicators are involved in at least one interaction term. The central institutional indicators seem to be the payroll tax, the entry barriers, and the minimum wage setting which take part in 5 interaction terms. Using the observations for 2005 for Germany, France, the United States, Japan, and Sweden, it is shown that similar reforms can have different effects on the labor market due to the dependence on other institutional factors.
The results imply that institutional reforms conditional on the institutional system are qualitatively as well as quantitatively important and can significantly contribute to reduce the unemployment rate. The findings are beneficial for policy-making by delivering a fundament for the macroeconomic ex ante evaluation of institutional reform decisions conditional on the institutional arrangement.
